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Prison Mail Censorship and
the First Amendment
The United States may give up the Post Office when it sees fit,
but while it carries it on the use of the mails is almost as much a
part of free speech as the right to use our tongues .... 1
In communicating with persons outside the penitentiary, prisoners
using the mails are frequently subjected to regulations which permit
prison officials to censor almost all correspondence for virtually any
reason.2 Although in any other context, such inhibitions on personal
and political expression would be viewed with grave suspicion,3 in
reviewing prison mail censorship, the courts typically defer to the
discretion and authority of prison administrators and refuse to apply
traditional First Amendment standards. 4
This Note will argue that the First Amendment is fully applicable
to prison mail regulation. In doing so, it will survey existing restric-
tions on prisoner correspondence, criticize present standards of review,
suggest appropriate First Amendment tests, and attempt to define the
maximum scope of prison mail censorship permissible under the First
Amendment.
I. Present Practices
Under presently operative judicially sanctioned prison mail regu-
lations, administrators possess nearly all the powers of an absolute
censor.5 The right to correspond is generally treated as a special dis-
pensation which will not be granted to an inmate unless he signs a
1. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes,
J., dissenting), quoted in Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 416 (1971).
2. Common regulations are described at pp. 87-90 infra. Though it is impossible to
calculate how many inmates are directly affected by mail regulations, there arc currently
160,000 inmates (21,000 of them federal) in 4037 penal institutions in the United States.
NEwswEEK, March 8, 1971, at 27; Berrigan v. Norton, 322 F. Supp. 46. 50 (D. Conn. 1971).
af'd, No. 71-1383 (2d Cir. Nov. 26, 1971).
3. Restrictions in other contexts on the use of the mails have often been struck
down. See, e.g., Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381
U.S. 301 (1965).
4. See, e.g., Brown v. Wainwright, 419 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1969); Berrigan v. Norton.
322 F. Supp. 46 (D. Conn. 1971), aff'd, No. 71-1383 (2d Cir. Nov. 26, 1971).
5. New York State's rule, for instance, vests unfettered discretion in the marden. See
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF CoRREcrIONS, INMATES' RuLE BooK 14 (1901) ("News-
papers, magazines, and books approved by the Warden may be received by an inmate
provided his behavior is good."), quoted in Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in
Prisons: A Manual for Prisoner Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REv. 473, 485 n.80 (1971).
For other discussions of the extent of mail censorship, see Symposium, Prisoners' Rights
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form authoiizing prison officials to inspect and censor his correspond-
ence.0 Even then, inmates usually are not permitted to correspond
with persons possessing criminal records, 7 and may be further restricted
to writing to only a small number of "approved" correspondents.8
In communicating with the limited group of persons acceptable to
the prison administration, prisoners can expect their mail to be in.
spected by members of the prison staff.0 While a very few institutions
allow inmates to send uninspected, uncensored mail to attorneys,
courts and public officials,' 0 the vast preponderance demand inspec-
tion of all mail, including correspondence with attorneys general,
governors, and the President and Vice-President."
and the Correctional Scheme: The Legal Controversy and Problems of Implemnentation,
16 ViLL. L. REV. 1029 (1971); Jacob, Prison Discipline and Inmates Rights, 5 HArrY. CIV.
RiGHTs-Civ. LIB. L. REV. 227 (1970); Singer, Censorship of Prisoners' Mail and the Con.
stitution, 56 A.B.A.J. 1051 (1970); Hirschkop & millemann, The Unconstitutionality of
Prison Life, 55 U. VA. L. REV. 795, 822 (1969); Note, The Right of Expression in Prison,
40 U. So. CAL. L. REv. 407 (1967); Note, Enforcement of Prison Discipline and Its Effect
Upon the Constitutional Rights of Those Imprisoned, 8 ViLL. L. REV. 379 (1963), Note,
Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review Complaints of
Convicts, 72 YALE L.. 506, 537-40 (1963); Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The
Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 985(1962).
6. See, e.g., Danbury, Conn. Federal Correctional Institution, Policy Statement CT.
7300.8, Nov. 30, 1970 (on file with the Yale Law Journal). By obtaining an inmate's
consent to the inspection, the prison attempts to insulate itself against possible Fourth
Amendment claims. See Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 781 (D.R.I. 1970);
cf. Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1919); United States v. Wilson, 447 F.2d
1, 8 n.7 (9th Cir. 1971); Denson v. United States, 424 F.2d 329, 331 (10th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 844 (1971); Hayes v. United States, 367 F2d 216, 222 (10th Cir,
1966).
7. The Bureau of Prisons regulations provide, however, that "the existence of a
criminal record, in and of itself, should not constitute a barrier to proposed correspond.
ence." Policy Statement, supra note 6; Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Manual
Bulletin No. 96-Revised (P.S. 7300.1), at 2, 3 (1962). For the application of such a regu.
lation, see Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962). But cf. Walker v.
Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, 29 (5th Cir. 1969); Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967),
Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
8. In Texas, for instance, the list is limited to five relatives. TExAs DEr"T OF Coit.
.ECT7ONs, RuLES AND REGULATIONS (1968), cited in Turner, supra note 5, at 486 n.91. In
the federal system, up to twelve correspondents are allowed. Policy Statement, supra
note 6, at 1; Manual Bulletin, supra note 7, at 31.
9. At least one state, Washington, has abandoned the policy of reading prisoner mall,
although incoming envelopes are opened to check for contraband. Turner, supra note 5,
at 480 n.40. But cf. note 131 infra.
10. This is true of Rhode Island, where a federal district court enjoined all Inspec.
tion and censorship of correspondence with these groups. Palmigiano v. Travlsono, 317
F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970). In the federal system, uninspected mail may be sent to
courts having jurisdiction over the inmate, to the President, Vice-President, Members
of Congress, governors, attorneys general, the Surgeon General, the Secretaries of the
military services, and the Board of Parole. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Policy Statement 7300.2A (1967).
11. Censorship of letters to these officials, however, is not normally allowed. Jacob,
supra note 5, at 238-39. Correspondence with attorneys is not inspected in Washington,
see note 9 supra, Rhode Island, see note 10 supra, and California, see Turner, supra
note 5, at 480 n.40, but is inspected in the federal system, see Jacob, supra note 5, at
238 n.52. In particular, the federal Manual Bulletin, supra note 7, at 2, provides:
Inmates shall be permitted to correspond with attorneys of record with whom con.
tracts have been executed, without limitation. Such correspondence shall be regarded
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Furthermore, prisoners typically may discuss only prescribed sub-
jects in their correspondence. For example, in the case of prisoner
manuscripts the Federal Bureau of Prisons' regulations specify:
An inmate may be permitted to submit a manuscript to a pub-
lisher or editor only after review and specific approval by the
Bureau .... A manuscript shall not be approved or released if
it deals with the life history or the criminal career of the writer
or that of any other inmate, or if it is libelous, lewd, obscene,
or pornographic. 12
Similarly, it is not unusual for regulations to proscribe correspond-
ence if "[ilt contain [sic] criminal or prison news," 13 to admonish the
inmate to "stick to your subject,"14 and to ban letters that are not
of a purely social nature.15
Naturally, such broad powers of censorship do not go unused. In
Carothers v. Follette,"' for example, an inmate attempted to send
his parents a letter which criticized the prison system and questioned
as 'privileged' and shall be subject to inspection only to the extent to prevent the
introduction of contraband or otherwise protect the good order and security of
the institution.
The Bulletin further provides that each federal correctional institution has the "re-
sponsibility for developing and promulgating . . such regulations as will achieve [the
institution's] desired objectives." Id. at 1.
12. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Policy feinorandum on Inmate ,Manu-
scripts 7200.14, at 2 (1966). This memorandum has been modified so that the reviewer
must now specify in writing the reasons for disapproval and the inmate may take all
manuscripts with him when he leaves the prison. Bureau of Prisons, US. Dep't of Justice,
Policy Statement 7300.7A (1971). In view of the absence of standards to guide administra-
tive actions pursuant to this rule, its constitutionality is dubious. See Berrigan v. Norton.
No. 71-1383, at 706 n.5 (2d Cir. Nov. 26, 1971) (sermon composed by Fathers Berrigan).
For other cases involving similar regulations, see Maas v. United States. 371 F.2d 348
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (Valachi Papers); Davis v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App.2d 8, 345 P.2d
513 (1959) (book written by Caryl Chessman). But cf. Tyler v. Ciccone, 299 F. Stipp. 634
(W.D. Mo. 1969) (manuscript written by unconvicted inmate of the United States Medical
Center for Federal Prisoners).
13. See the Green Haven Special Letter Form at issue in Carothers v. Follette, 314
F. Supp. 1014, 1024-25 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Similar regulations were challenged in Lee
v. Tahash, 252 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965). in Labat v. M'cKeithen, 243 F. Supp. 662 (E.D.
La. 1965), afj'd, 361 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1966), and in McCray v. State, 40 U.S.L.W. 2307,
2309 (Md. Cir. Ct. Nov. 11, 1971) ("criticism of the institution" invalid as grounds for
censorship).
14. See Green Haven Special Letter Form, supra note 13.
15. Business correspondence is usually explicitly prohibited. The Manual Bulletin,
supra note 7, at 2, states:
[N]o inmate may be permitted to direct his business, no matter how legitimate his
business might be, while he is in confinement. This does not go to the point of
prohibiting correspondence necessary to enable the inmate to protect and husband
the property and funds that were legitimately his at the time he -as committed to
the institution.
See also Policy Statement, supra note 6, at 1-2; Beyond the Ken of the Courts, supra
note 5, at 539; pp. 103-04 infra. Religious correspondence has generally been protected
by courts. See, e.g., Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969); Peek v. Ciccone,
288 F. Supp. 529, 334, 338 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Cooper v. Pate, 324 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1963),
rev'd per curiam, 278 U.S. 546 (1964), on remand, 382 F.2d 518 (1967); Mitford, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 3, 1971, § 7 (Book Review), at 7, cols. 1-4.
16. 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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the competence of the staff.17 Prison officials not only censored the
entire letter, but also charged the convict with "making derogatory
and lying statements about the Department of Correction and admin-
istration of this Institution," an offense for which he was punished
by deprivation of "good time."1" The Carothers case is by no means
unique. Censorship is often accompanied by severe punishment, 19 and
prison administrators have gone to great lengths to enforce inspection
and censorship rules. 20
II. The Limited Quality of Judicial Review
While in non-prison contexts courts have not hesitated to strike
down regulations which vest in administrative officials unrestricted
control over First Amendment conduct,2 until very recently the nearly
universal response of the courts to prison mail regulations-even those
which prison officials admit are devoid of any well-defined standards
to guide administrative discretion 22-has been that "the control of
prison mail regulation is a matter of prison administration."U This
reluctance to review complaints which involve "prison administration"
is usually phrased in terms of the "hands-off" doctrine,-' a form of
judicial self-restraint which appears to be based upon the premise that
17. The letter contained phrases such as the following: "The prison s)sten in New
York State stinks . . . .The people in charge are not qualified . . . . Half the cr-
ployees did not get out of high school . . . .This gang of political appointees ....
Hanky-panky with U.S. mail .... Anything to obstruct legal work." 314 F. Supp. at 1021.
18. The court held this to be an "unjustifiable overreaction." 314 F. Supp. at 1026.
19. See, e.g., Mason v. Peyton, Civ. No. 5611-R (E.D. Va, filed Feb. 2, 1168), described
in Hirschkop & Millemann, supra note 5, at 798.99; Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683
(E.D. Ark. 1965). Cf. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified
sub nora. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc). Simply prohibiting
such punishment has proved ineffective; courts condemned the practice long ago. Se',
e.g., Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370, 377 (D.D.C. 1962); Jacob, supra note 5,
at 239.
20. Consider, for example, the actions of one warden, who, following the publication
of a manuscript describing his prison written by five inmates and smuggled to the press,
conditioned the visiting rights of all inmates upon their submitting to "skin searches."
Mitford, supra note 15.
21. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Staub v. City
of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958). Cf. note 3 supra.
22. See, e.g., Berrigan v. Norton, 322 F. Supp. 46, 51 (D. Conn.), af'd, No. 71-138:;, at
706 n.5 (2d Cir. Nov. 26, 1971).
23. Brown v. Wainwright, 419 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Diehl v. Wainwrlght,
419 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1969); Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504 (10th Cir. 1969); Clilds
v. Pigelow, 321 F.2d 487, 489 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 932 (1961); Baining
v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954); Nunier v. Miller,
165 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1948).
24. The "hands-off" doctrine has been discussed extensively. See, e.g., Goldfarb &
Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 175 (1970); Jacob, supra
note 5; Note, Decency and Fairness: An Esnerging Judicial Role in Prison Reformu, 57
VA. L. REv. 841 (1971); Note, Constitutional Limitations on Conditions of Pretrial De-
tention, 79 YALE L.J. 941 (1970); Note, The Problems of Modern Penology: Prison Life
and Prisoner Rights, 53 IOWA L. REv. 671 (1967); The Right of Expression in Prison,
supra note 5; Constitutional Rights of Prisoners, supra note 5.
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courts should decline jurisdiction over prison matters in deference to
administrative expertise,2 as well as upon the assumption that inmates
simply do not possess the constitutional rights enjoyed by free citizens.20
Neither of these premises underlying the "hands-off" doctrine jus-
tifies continued abstention from subjecting prison mail regulations
to constitutional scrutiny. In general, the principle of deference to
administrative expertise loses much of its force when the constitution-
ality of the administrative action itself is at issue.27 In the specific
case of prison administration, the Supreme Court has held, in Cooper
v. Pate,- s that an inmate's allegation "that the restrictions placed upon
his activities -are in violation of his constitutional rights"20 states a
cause of action under the Civil Rights Act 0 which must be heard
on its merits.31
25. This premise was made quite explicit in Sawyer v. Sigler, 445 F.2d 818 (8th Cir.
1971), when the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit gently admonished a district
court for having been overly receptive to prisoners' claims. The Court stated in dictum:
"we wish to emphasize our frequently expressed view that the federal courts . .. should
not be unduly hospitable forums for the cornplaints of... convicts; it is not the function
of the courts to run the prisons . . .; much must be left to the discretion and good
faith of prison administrators." Id. at 819.
26. See, e.g., Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871). One
commentator has recently suggested that the historical context of the Bill of Rights and
the language of the Thirteenth Amendment support the view that risoners are slaves
of the state. Comment, Prisoner Correspondence: An Appraisal of the Judicial Refusal
to Abolish Banishment as a Form of Punishment, 62 J. CiuM. L. C. & P. S. 40, 51-54 (1971).
It seems doubtful, however, that any state would today claim to own the bodies of its
prisoners. See Holt v. Sarver, 509 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), afj'd, 442 F.2d 304 (Sth
Cir. 1971).
Other arguments sometimes offered in support of the "hands.off" doctrine include the
separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive, the fear that a flood of
litigation would follow relaxation of the doctrine, and, with respect to federal courts,
the exhaustion of remedies principle. See Johnson v. Avery, 82 F.2d 353, 355 (6th Cir.),
rev'd, 593 U.S. 483 (1969); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 524 (2d Cir. 1967); Pierce
v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233, 234-35 (2d Cir. 1961); Powell v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 330, 331
(10th Cir. 1949).
27. See Oestereich v. Selective Service Bd., 393 U.S. 233, 241-43 (1963) (Harlan. J..
concurring); L. JArFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF AD.MINISTRATIvE Ac TioN 591-92 (1965); cf.
Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965, 980-88 (1969).
28. 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam).
29. 324 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd per curiami, 378 U.S. 546 (1964). on remand,
382 F.2d 518 (1967). Cooper, a Black Muslim, alleged violations of First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights arising from the actions of prison administrators in interfering with
his communications with his minister, prohibiting religious services, and preventing
his purchase of various Muslim publications. The court of appeals invoked the "hands.
off" doctrine and refused to consider the merits of the claim.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). In recognizing a § 1983 claim by prisoners, Cooper added
a more versatile procedure for challenging the constitutionality of aspects of confinement
to the already existing federal remedy of habeas corpus. On the various procedural mech-
anisms available for the assertion of inmate claims, see Beyond the Ken of the Courts,
supra note 5, at 507-14. On habeas corpus in particular, see Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus:
Post Conviction Remedy for State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 461 (1960). For a graphic
example of the advantages of civil rights actions over writs of habeas corpus, see Sostre
v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en bane); cf. Wilwording v. Swenson, 92 S. Ct.
407 (1971) (per curiam).
31. 378 U.S. at 546. Since the decision in Cooper, lower courts have been more dis-
posed to entertain constitutional claims of prisoners. See cases cited, infra notes 34.37,
41-44.
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Nevertheless, even when courts do not summarily dismiss the First
Amendment complaints of prisoners as outside their jurisdiction, the
scope of their review is frequently limited by the pervasive assumption
that prisoners possess no "right" to use the mails, and, hence, prison
mail regulations cannot contravene the First Amendment.3 2 Yet, after
Cooper, the influential opinion in Coffin v. Reichard,33 and numerous
other lower court cases holding the due processA' equal protection,"
cruel and unusual punishment,30 and free exercise 37 clauses fully ap-
plicable to the prison environment, it should be clear that conviction
and incarceration do not strip a man of all constitutional rights.8 8 Since
the premise that the state may do as it wishes with its prisoners30 can
no longer be justified, it should not serve to insulate the prison system
32. See, e.g., Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 1965):
[T]he fact that prison authorities . . . have refused to allow mailing of some par.
ticular letter or letters or to some particular person or persons does not of Itself
afford basis for a prisoner to try to get into the federal courts.
See also Berrigan v. Norton, No. 71-1383 (2d Cir. Nov. 26, 1971); Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d
504, 506 (10th Cir. 1969); Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1966), afI'd
per curiam, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); Labat v. McKeithen, 243 F. Snpp. 662 (E.D. La. 1965),
aff'd, 361 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1966).
33. 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944) (per curiam), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (19-15). Al.
though Coffin involved a claim of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of tile
Eighth Amendment, the court's analysis that "[a] prisoner retains all the rights of an
ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication taken from him by
the law," id. at 445, has had a wider application.
34. See, e.g., cases cited, Turner, supra note 5, at 478-79 nn.30, 35, 38; note 70 infra.
35. See, e.g., Toles v. Katzenbach, 385 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1967), vacated as moot, 392
U.S. 662 (1968); Rivers v. Royster, 360 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1966); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.
Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Washington v. Lee, 263
F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd per curiamn, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
36. See, e.g., Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir, 1971). See also Bethea v.
Crouse, 417 F.2d 504 (10th Cir. 1969) (inadequate medical care); Jackson v. Bishop, 401
F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (corporal punishment); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d
Cir. 1967) (prolonged exposure to cold). But cf. Church v. Hegstrom, 416 F.,.d 149 (2d
Cir. 1969) (negligently inadequate medical care).
For discussions of the Eighth Amendment, see Decency and Fairness, supra note 24,
at 848-64; Prisoner Correspondence, supra note 26, at 49-51; Note, The Role of the
Eighth Amendment in Prison Reform, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 647 (1971); Note, The Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 MARV. L. RLV.
635 (1966).
37. See, e.g., Northern v. Nelson, No. 26,357 (9th Cir. Sept. 22, 1971) (confiscation of
newspaper Muhammad Speaks violates Civil Rights Act); Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228
(4th Cir. 1971); Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969); Barnett v. Rodgers, 410
F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3rd Cir. 1968); Pierce v. La
Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961).
38. Had the Supreme Court in Cooper adopted the position that incarceration strips
a prisoner of all constitutional rights, it hardly would have ordered the court of appeals
to reconsider the prisoner's claim on its merits. See also In re Harrell, 2 Cal.3d 675,
702, 470 P.2d 640, 658, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504, 522 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S, 914 (1971) ("In
this state we have long since abandoned the medieval concept of strict 'civil death' .. .").
39. This premise surfaced in its baldest terms in Labat v. McKeithen, 243 F. Supp.
662 (E.D. La. 1965), affd, 361 F.2d 757 (.,th Cir. 1966). In upholding a warden's decision
to terminate the correspondence between a Black prisoner on death row and a white
woman in Sweden, the court reasoned that since the state has the right to deprive a man
of his life, it could also "deprive him of other privileges along the way to final reckoning"
so long as it did so non-discriminatorily. Id. at 666. See also note 25 supra.
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from the demands of the free expression clause.40 Instead, the courts
should face the fundamental question of what the First Amendment
should mean as applied to prison life.41
III. Applying the First Amendment
Those courts that have regarded prison mail censorship as a genuine
First Amendment problem have employed a bewildering variety of
tests by which to evaluate the constitutionality of the regulations.
Some courts seek "clear and present dangers,"42 others demand "com-
40. Professor Emerson has offered at least four interrelated reasons for the priority
of First Amendment rights. First, the right of free expression is essential to an indi-
vidual's self-realization, to the development of his "character and potentialities as a
human being." Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877, 879 (1963). Suppression constitutes an affront to the dignity of the individual.
Second, free expression is invaluable to a society devoted to the attainment of truth. Id.
at 881. In Learned Hand's words:
[The First Amendment] presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be
gathered.out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritarian
selection. To many this is, and alwa)s will be folly; but we have staked upon it
our all.
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aJJ'd, 326 U.S. 1
(1945). Third, free expression provides "for participation in decision-making through a
process of open discussion which is available to all members of the community." Toward
a General Theory, supra, at 882. See also De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937);
A. MAiKLEJOHN, POLrrCAL FaREEDo.: THE CoxsrrrTirnoAL PowERs OF tE PLoPLE (1960).
Finally, freedom of speech promotes the rational compromise essential to a viable de-
mocracy; it is "a method of achieving a more adaptable and at the same time more stable
community, of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary
consensus." Toward a General Theory, supra, at 884. See also Bagehot. The Metaphysical
Basis of Toleration, in 2 WORKs OF WALTER BAGEHOT 339, 357 (Morgan ed. 1891) CPer-
secution in intellectual countries produces a superficial conformity, but also underneath
an intense, incessant, implacable doubt'). For turther enumerations of the functions of
the First Amendment, see T. EMERsoN., THE SYsrE.t OF FR.EOmot OF Extnassio, (1970)
[hereinafter cited as EMESON, THE SYSTEM]; Emerson, Freedom of Association and Free-
dom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964).
These principles underlying the First Amendment apply, in varying degrees, to free-
dom of expression in prisons and, with particular force, to communications between
prisoners and the general population. Human dignity and self-realization mean as much.
if not more, to the imprisoned as they do to other members of society. Information and
perspectives supplied by the prison population cannot be curtailed without endangering
the attainment of truth and the "open discussion" vital to democratic decision-making.
Suppression of prisoners' views can only impede the realization of an adaptable, yet
stable society.
Accordingly, other commentators have argued that the First Amendment is gener-
ally applicable to prisons. See, e.g., The Right of Expression in Prison, supra note 5.
Lower court cases applying the freedom of expression clause to prison mail regulations
include Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 40 U.S.L.W. 2291 (1st Cir. Nov. 4, 1971); Brown %'. Peyton,
437 F.2d 1228, 1230 (4th Cir. 1971); Le Vier v. Woodson, 443 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1971);
Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968); Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp.
901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
41. This conclusion is entirely consistent with Mr. Justice Murphy's oft-quoted dictum
in Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948), that "lawful incarceration brings about the
necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified
by the considerations underlying our penal system." A proper First Amendment analysis
cannot be divorced from "the considerations underlying our penal system."
42. E.g., Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816, 822 (3rd Cir. 1968). Petitioners were Black
Muslim inmates not permitted to receive and read publications of their religious sect,
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pelling interests, " 43 and still others pursue "less drastic means." 44 In
this section it will be shown that two traditional First Amendment
doctrines-less drastic means and prior restraints-are particularly
suitable for ascertaining the constitutionality of prison mail regula-
tions, and these doctrines will be used to define a set of regulations
which adequately effectuate legitimate administrative objectives with-
out infringing the First Amendment rights of prisoners.
A. Less Drastic Means
The less drastic means test 45 generally has been utilized by the
Supreme Court in cases where government regulation impinges in-
directly on the First Amendment freedoms of expression and asso-
ciation.40 When the government is pursuing substantial, legitimate
interests unrelated to the content of the expression, the Court may
well ask whether the objectives are attainable in some way that is less
restrictive of individual liberties.
47
including Muhammad Speaks, on the grounds that they were "highly inflammatory." In
this, the first application by an appellate court of a traditional First Amendment test
to a prison, the court held:
To justify the prohibition of religious literature, the prison officials must prove
that the literature creates a clear and present danger of a breach of prison security
or discipline or some other substantial interference with the orderly functioning of
the institution.
For similar holdings, see Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036, 1049 (E.D. Pa. 1969);
Banks v. Havener, 234 F. Supp. 27, 30 (ED. Va. 1964).
43. E.g., Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The court
voided a warden's refusal to allow inmates to subscribe to a newsletter on prison reform
published by ex-convicts. It held that in order to censor incoming materials, the state
must show a "compelling interest centering about prison security, or a clear and present
danger of a breach of prison discipline, or some substantial interference with orderly
institutional administration."
44. E.g., Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 532, 542 (5th Cir. 1968). Petitioner claimed
he had been denied permission to subscribe to "national Negro magazines." Though
prison officials maintained that they had been granted statutory authority to control
the admission of reading material so as to preserve the institution s order and discipline,
the court held that administrators must employ the least restrictive alternative means
if they attempt to preserve order and discipline by censoring the contents of incoming
publications, and enjoined prison administrators from interfering with petitioner's sub.
scription to, and receipt of, the magazines he requested.
45. The entire analysis could easily be recast in terms of the overbreadth doctrine
(see Note. Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 n.3 (1969))
and references to overbreadth will be made in the text. For a general discussion of the
overbreadth and vagueness doctrines, see, e.g., Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844 (1970); Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law,
69 COLUM. L. REv. 808 (1969); Note, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 75 (1960).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); cf. United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1968); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71
YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Note, Civil Disabilities and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J.
842, 845-46 n.16 (1969).
47. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960):
[E]ven though the government purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
Prison Mail Censorship and the First Amendment
Prison mail regulations fit nicely into this framework. Some of the
government interests underlying the regulations-in general terms,
restraint and rehabilitation 4 8-- are obviously "important or substan-
tial" and, at the same time, "unrelated to the suppression of free ex-
pression."4 9 Nevertheless, as presently formulated, nearly all such
regulations "broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the
end can be more narrowly achieved." 0
In applying the less drastic means test to prison mail regulation, it
is essential to identify with precision the government interests which
are said to justify the controls.5 ' The interest in physical restraint
underlies those regulations which, administrators contend, are imple-
mented to detect escape plans, 2 to intercept incoming weapons,
drugs,5 3 or other contraband and to confiscate obscene or "inflamma-
tory" literature.54 Likewise, the interest in prisoner rehabilitation is
said to lie at the core of those regulations which are designed to
isolate an inmate from undesirable outside influences. 5
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when
the end can be more narrowly achieved.
In this respect, the less drastic means test is marginal balancing- that is, the state's
interest in the added effectiveness of the chosen means is balanced against the individual's
interest in the use of less drastic ones. Less Drastic Means, supra note 45, at 469-70.
48. The inclusion of retribution or deterrence as legitimate state interests would not
alter the analysis, for if society thinks that a prisoner's life should be made more un-
pleasant, there are many ways to reach that end without stifling his First Amendment
rights. Lengthening work hours, for example, would probably not violate the Eighth
Amendment, but would add to the burden of prison life. Hence, under the less drastic
means test, these two putative state interests cannot justify any prison mail regulations.
Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 40 U.S.L.W. 2291, 2292 (lst Cir. Nov. 4, 1971); cf. The Right of
Expression in Prison, supra note 5, at 413.
49. The quoted language describing aspects of the less drastic means test is taken
from Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
50. Id.
51. The identification is difficult, since defendant wardens and court opinions usu-
ally present these justifications in the most general terms. See, e.g., Coleman v. Peyton,
362 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 905 (1967); McCloskey v. Maryland,
337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1954); Jacob, supra note 5, at 231. But see Palmigiano v. Travisono,
317 F. Supp. 776, 783 (D.R.I. 1970).
52. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc); Carothers v.
Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp.
716 (D.R.I. 1970).
53. See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 783 (D.RJ. 1970).
54. See, e.g., Long v. Parker, 890 F.2d 816 (3rd Cir. 1968); Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis,
319 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
55. At the Federal Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut, for instance,
there is a blanket prohibition on correspondence with former associates in crime for
this reason. However, if the associate is a member of the inmate's family or a co-
defendant in a criminal proceeding, provision is made for limited communication. In-
terview with William E. Key, Chief Classification and Parole Officer, Federal Correc-
tional Institution, Danbury, Connecticut, March 19, 1971 (on file with the Yale Law
Journat). See also note 7 supra.
Other interests have been suggested occasionally. Prison authorities have sometimes
pointed to prevention of confidence schemes and conspiracies between inmates and free
persons, as well as to avoidance of the mailing of obscene or threatening letters to free
persons. See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.L 1970). In Berrigan
The Yale Law Journal
The substantiality of the government interests set forth could, of
course, be disputed,5 6 but they have usually been accepted as legiti-
mate by the courts,37 and for the limited purpose of applying the
less drastic means test, these interests can be assumed substantial
enough to warrant some infringement on First Amendment freedoms.
With this assumption the less drastic means approach affords adminis-
trators the maximum constitutionally sustainable power of censorship.
Prohibition. The most drastic means of regulating prisoner corre-
spondence would be to forbid the use of the mails altogether.08 Al-
though few regulations are this Procrustean,50 two common forms of
regulation which deny inmates the opportunity to use the mail are
limiting the number of letters an inmate may send in a given period
of time or the number of correspondents he may have, 6 and forbid.
ding correspondence with certain classes of persons."'
Each of these modes of regulation operates too harshly to meet the
requirements of the less drastic means test. First, artificial constraints
on the number of eligible recipients bear no relation whatever to the
general goals of restraint and rehabilitation, and limitations on the
frequency of mailings are connected to the ultimate state interests
v. Norton, 322 F. Supp. 46 (D. Conn.), afrd, No. 71-1383 (2d Cir. Nov. 26, 1971), the gov.
ernment claimed that release of the priests' radical views voiced in their confiscated sermon
would place them in danger of retaliation from conservative inmates. Government Interests
such as these, however, have been rejected by most courts as being, at best, weakly
correlated with the twin goals of restraint and rehabilitation. See, e.g., Palmigiano v,
Travisono, supra; Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 690 n.4 (E.D. Ark. 1965). But cf.
Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). For a more extensive
survey of government interests in this area, see Prisoner Correspondence, supra note 26,
For discussions of the interests pertaining to unconvicted detainees, see Scale v. Manson,
326 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Conn. 1971); Palmigiano v. Travisono, supra.
56. For example, although courts readily accept prison authorities' contention that
the need to prevent escapes justifies inspection of an inmate's outgoing mall for the
presence of escape plans, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc),
it is impossible to determine whether, or how many, inmates would use the mails to
plan escapes if the authorities did not inspect their mail. State interests, such as this
one, are subjected to a more rigorous scrutiny at pp. 108-10 infra.
57. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc). But cf.
Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
58. Prison officials apparently regard this approach as well within their power. Con.
necticut Department of Corrections, Directive 2.18 (1970), advises state institutions to
grant correspondence privileges, but emphasizes that "the courts have ruled that (they]
are a privilege, not a right."
59. But inmates in solitary confinement are usually denied correspondence rights
available to other prisoners. See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 445 F.2d 801, 802 (5th Cir. 1971) (per
curiam); cf. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971). In addition, admih.
istrators are sometimes empowered to curtail much of individual inmates' mail oil tile
basis of standards that should be held void for vagueness. See, e.g., Turner, supra note
5, at 485 n.80.
60. See, e.g., TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 8 (three letters per week)
61. See, e.g., TExAs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 8 (restricting correspond.
ence to "members of the family unless the inmate has good reason to select others);
Green Haven Special Letter Form, supra note 13 (banning correspondence with newspaper
personnel).
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only indirectly, if at all, through the rubric of administrative con-
venience.62 Since, however, it has been shown that elimination of
these restrictions would result in only a negligible increase in corre-
spondence, 63 even the administrative ease argument cannot justify the
limitations. The less drastic alternative is simply a system of regula-
tions without number and frequency controls.
Second, rules preventing an inmate from corresponding with certain
classes of people, such as members of the media, are too drastic.
They typically include reliable individuals with whom correspondence
would jeopardize no state interest whatever.64 Furthermore, any given
letter, even one to or from a person with whom communication de-
monstrably endangers government interests, may contain, at least in
part, perfectly harmless material. Thus inspection and selective dele-
tion of portions of a letter are always less drastic means for effectuating
government interests than are flat prohibitions on sending or receiv-
ing mail.65
Inspection. The fact that inspection and deletion is always a less
restrictive alternative than outright prohibition does not imply that
inspection of all inmate mail is warranted. On the contrary, inspection
of correspondence, in itself, constitutes a substantial infringement
of freedom of expression,66 and none of the rationales propounded
62. It has been suggested that administrative convenience cannot be used to justify
curtailing a constitutional right. See, e.g., Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bar-
gaining, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1387, 1406 (1970); cf. E.tERso., TuE SYsMrIs, supra note 40,
at 340. However, reasonable regulations as to the time, place, and manner of prisoner
access to the mails, implemented for the sake of administrative ease, should be consti-
tutionally acceptable. Cf. note 121 infra. A general definition of "reasonableness" in this
context is rather hard to come by, but courts have struck down particular per se rules
as to time, place and manner of other First Amendment activities for being unduly
harsh. See, e.g., LeFlore v. Robinson, 434 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1970); Mosley v. Police Dep't,
432 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3159 (Oct. 12, 1971).
63. See Prisoner Correspondence, supra note 26, at 42 n.25; Morris, Prisons in Evolu.
tion, 29 FED. PROB. 20 (1965).
64. Outright mail prohibitions thus suffer from the same affliction which the Supreme
Court found so prevalent in the anti-Communist legislation of the '40s and '503. In
cases such as Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (conspirac prosecution), United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (employment in defense instal ation), and Ellbrandt
v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) (public employee loyalty oath), the Court forbade penalizing
or denying privileges to all members of organizations thought to be subversive in favor
of regulation directed at "only 'active' members having also a guilty knowledge and
intent," 367 U.S. at 228. See generally Comment, Judicial Rewriting of Overbroad Statutes:
Protecting the Freedom of Association from Scales to Robel, 57 Ctt.WF. L. Ray. 240 (1969).
Like legislation which "sweeps indiscriminately across all types of association with Con-
munist-action groups, without regard to the quality and degree of membership," 389 U.S.
at 262, blanket prohibitions on correspondence without attention to the character of
the correspondents are constitutionally unpalatable. Cf. note 81 infra.
65. Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 40 U.S.L.W. 2291, 2292 (Ist Cir. Nov. 4, 1971).
66. By reading his letters, prison authorities are able to identify an inmate as the
author or recipient of ideas of which they disapprove, and punishment is frequently
imposed for the written expression of those ideas. See pp. 89-9t and cases cited, note 19
supra; Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1948); Meola v. Fitzpatrick, 322 F. Supp.
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for mail regulation can support universal inspection. 7
This conclusion can best be reached by analyzing the relationships
between inmate correspondence with specific classes of recipients and
the governmental interests of restraint and rehabilitation. Inspection
of mail involving courts, attorneys or public officials0 s not only un-
dermines the rights guaranteed by the free speech and petition clauses
of the First Amendment, 9 but also violates the Fifth Amendment due
process right of access to the courts,70 and negates the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel.7 1 Under the less drastic means test, neither
of the accepted government interests can support inspection of this
type of mail. Judges, attorneys and many public officials are members
of the bar. All hold positions of public trust and are subject to public
scrutiny. The likelihood that judicial or executive officers will traffic
in contraband, illegally plot with prisoners or impede their rehabili-
tation is so slim that any regulation which encompasses inspection of
prisoner correspondence with these groups is manifestly overbroad. 7-'
878 (D. Mass. 1971). Consequently, the problem of "identification and fear of reprisal,"
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960). is far graver than it was in those cases where
the Supreme Court held that the state may not compel members of groups engaged In
the dissemination of ideas to be identified publicly, see Bates v. City of Little Rock,
561 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). In addition, the fact
that inspection, even without expurgation, is sufficient to raise a First Amendment
problem should follow a fortiori from Talley v. California, supra, where the Court
invalidated as void on its face a municipal ordinance which required handbills to display
the names of their printer and author.
67. Accord, Barrett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
68. Of course, the protections outlined in the text for mail with courts, attorneys and
public officials apply only when those persons are corresponding or being written to
in their official or professional capacities.
69. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 200 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc). No visiting
legislator or occasional investigation can discover or portray as well as the inmate him.
self the impact of the day-to-day operations of a correctional institution. Cf. United
States ex rel. Thompson v. Fay, 197 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (inmate not permitted
to communicate with committee studying problems of indigent inmates). See also Pris.
oner Correspondence, supra note 23, at 45.
70. This interference does not result from the simple inspection of court papers,
which after all are public documents, but rather from the high incidence of punishment
still meted out to inmates for the contents of mail sent to courts and attorneys and
deemed objectionable by prison administrators. See cases cited, supra note 19 and infra
note 72. The courts have long recognized that prisoners depend upon them for vindi.
cation of their rights and have made it clear that "the Constitution protects with special
solicitude, a prisoner's access to the courts." See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483
(1969); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941). For an early discussion of the right of prisoners
to seek access to the courts, see Constitutional Rights of Prisoners, supra note 5.
71. Both invasion of the right of privacy of counsel (see, e.g., Krull v. United States,
240 F.2d 122, 127 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 915 (1957); Coplon v. United States,
191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952)) and interrogation and
punishment of inmates based on the content of communication with counsel (see, e.g.j
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc)) eviscerate the Sixth Amend.
ment's guarantee. See also note 76 infra.
72. See Le Vier v. Woodson, 443 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1971); Landman v. Royster, 40
U.S.L.W. 2256 (E.D. Va. Oct. 30, 1971); Meola .v. Fitzpatrick, 322 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass.
1971); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970); Carothers v. Foilette, 314
F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); cf. Peoples v. Wainwright, 325 F. Supp. 402 (M.D. Flia.
1971); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370, 376-77 (D.D.C. 1962); Turner, supra note
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While visions of unscrupulous attorneys assisting prisoners in criminal
enterprises may be slightly less fanciful, 73 the likely extent of such
impropriety is so slight that it has been held that "[t]here is no logical
nexus between censorship of attorney-inmate mail and penal admin-
istration." 74 In short, because prisoners can be confined and rehabili-
tated quite as well, if not better,73 with mail regulations which do not
entail routine inspection of communications with courts, attorneys, and
public officials, inspection of such mail cannot be sustained under the
less drastic means test.7 6
With respect to all other groups, however, the outcome of the less
drastic means test is very different. Although peculiar problems are
presented by inspection of correspondence with the media, 7 business
associates,78 friends and family,70 the presumption that members of
5, at 479. But see Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en bane); Sindair v.
Henderson, 331 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (E.D. La. 1971); Marsh v. Moore, 325 F. Supp. 392,
595 (D. Mass. 1971).
73. The circumstances surrounding the death of George Jackson at San Quentin
raise this possibility. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1971, at 52, cols. 3-8. See also Lee v. Tahash,
352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965).
Prison officials also argue that some correspondents could impersonate attorneys or
use an attorney's stationery while carrying on illicit business with a prisoner. Turner,
supra note 5, at 479. However, since prison administrators can easily determine whether
or not a person is a member of the bar, id. at 480, this rationale does not survive the
less drastic means test.
74. Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 789 (D.R.L 1970). See also Brabson v.
Wilkins, 19 N.Y.2d 433, 459, 227 N.E2d 383, 386; 280 N.Y.S.2d 561, 565 (1957) (Keating.
J., dissenting):
[T]he right of a prisoner to unexpurgated communications with his attorney is so
significant that it outweighs the danger of frustration of prison rules regarding
outside activities in the rare case where an attorney-an officer of the court--.
would assist a prisoner in avoiding legitimate prison regulations.
75. See p. 103 infra.
76. In exceptional circumstances, where authorities have probable cause to believe
inspection of a particular letter or package in this category would lead to the discovery
of criminal activity, inspection, pursuant to a search warrant, would be permissible.
See pp. 108-09 infra.
77. Communication with the media is important in assuring informed public debate
and discussion. See p. 104 infra. Furthermore, from the perspective of the incarcerated,
the press has traditionally been one mechanism whereby redress of grievances is sought,
and in some cases, the right to publicize grievances through the media may coalesce
with the right to petition judicial and executive officers. See, e.g., McDonough v. Director
of Patuxent Institution, 429 F.2d 1189 (4th Cir. 1970) (prisoner must be permitted to
write Playboy magazine in effort to raise funds for his legal defense, but letters must
not be critical of prison administrators).
78. Despite the "commercial speech" doctrine, see Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 US.
52 (1942); Redish, The First Amendment in the Marhetplace: Commercial Speech and
the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo. WVAsh. L. Rxv. 429 (1971), the First Amendment
protections apply to correspondence with former business associates in that the extent
to which a letter is "commercial" may be in dispute. Furthermore, insofar as they are
not structural incidents of confinement, regulations which prohibit inmates from directing
legitimate business activity, see note 15 supra, are suspect under Coffin v. Reichard, 143
F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944) (per curiam). cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945). For commentary
on and applications of the Coffin doctrine, see, e.g., Singer, Bringing the Constitution to
Prison: Substantive Due Process and the Eighth Amendment, 39 U. Cm,. L. Ry. 650
(1970); The Right of Expression in Prison, supra note 5.
79. Family and friends may be the persons most likely to assist prisoners in escapes,
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these groups are trustworthy and would not supply information
detrimental to rehabilitation is far weaker than it is with courts,
attorneys, and public officials. Giving maximum credence to the fears
of prison officials concerning the use of the mail for transmission of
escape plans, weapons, obscenity and the like, inspection and a care-
fully circumscribed amount of censorship"° of mail not involving at-
torneys and judicial and executive officers should be sustained under
the less drastic means test.8 1
Censorship. Since mail inspection is justifiable only in terms of spe-
cific government interests related to restraint and rehabilitation, cen-
sorship of the contents of correspondence must be tailored precisely to
those same interests. There is, of course, no First Amendment objec-
tion to the removal of physical contraband such as weapons and nar-
cotics from mail for which inspection is permissible, 2 but when
prison authorities are concerned with removing words, it becomes
necessary to determine what writings are not protected speech.88
to supply contraband, etc., and correspondence with certain friends may be thought to
threaten a prisoner's rehabilitation. This group is therefore distinguishable from judges,
attorneys and public officials, at least for the purpose of upholding inspcction under
the less drastic means test. But see note 81 infra.
80. See p. 102 infra.
81. It can be argued, however, that inspection of all mail to or from members of
these groups is also overbroad. The overbreadth principle, derived from the cases
enumerated at note 64 supra, was carried furthest in United States v. Robel, 389 U.S,
258 (1967), where the Court, eschewing the suggestion that it balance the interests In-
volved, held that all members of "Communist-action" groups could not be barred from
working in non-sensitive defense installations since there was available the less drastic
means of investigating the reliability of individual applicants.
Prison administrators are in the same position as defense employers. Inspection of
all correspondence with the media, business associates, family and friends without atten.
tion to the character of the individual correspondent is much like the legislation in-
validated in Robel for "sweep[ing] indiscriminately across all types of association ...
without regard to the quality and degree of membership." 389 U.S. at 262. If Robel
were to govern, prison administrators would be allowed to inspect only correspondence
with specific individuals shown to be "security risks."
On the other hand, for sensitive positions the Robel opinion does not conclusively
establish that a security investigation program would be required; blanket prohibitions
might be sustained for those positions. It may be that prison conditions are best analogized
to sensitive defense industries, and that Robel does not invalidate universal inspection
of correspondence with media, business associates, family and friends, Although this is
the result that has been indicated in the text, it should be clear that this represents
the weakest application of the less drastic means test. While inspection of mail with
only these groups is certainly less drastic than inspection of mail with all groups, It Is
hardly the least restrictive alternative.
82. Indeed, use of the mails to send such materials to inmates may constitute a
criminal offense. See, e.g., N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:104-12 (1951).
83. Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970). It might be argued that
correctional institutions should have the power to read, though not to delete, Inmate
correspondence as an aid in "the disclosing of problems at home and at the institution
which may be upsetting or troublesonhe to the inmate," AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL Asso-
CIATION, A MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 546 (3d ed. 1966); however, since the
knowledge that their mail may be read may make inmates wary of placing intimate
thoughts in letters and thereby intensify their sense of isolation and alienation, see note
95 infra, the net rehabilitative value of this form of mail inspection is problematical,
Vol. 81: 87, 1971
Prison Mail Censorship and the First Amendment
Under current doctrine, First Amendment protections do not extend
to writings that (1) are part of a criminal scheme whose object is not
the expression of ideas,84 (2) are found to be obscene,8 ' (3) are
classified as "commercial," 80 or (4) are determined to be an "incite-
ment" to illegal action.8 7 Of course, in ascertaining which material in
a prisoner's mail fits within these unprotected categories, prison ad-
ministrators should be held to those standards and procedures devel-
oped by the Supreme Court in other areas. Obscenity should be defined
according to the principles promulgated in Roth v. United Statess8
and its progeny.8 9 Incitement should also be defined strictly, by careful
contextual inquiry into the actual likelihood of "imminent lawless
action," as in the line of cases culminating in Brandenburg v. Ohio.0
In addition, even if this mode of regulation were of unquestionable rehabilitative value.
the practice should be rejected under the less drastic means test, for "[it] has been
shown that any problems which might be presented ...will come to staff attention,
generally by the inmate himself in a request to see the Chaplain, counselor, or institu-
tional parole officer." AMF_.CAN CORPECTiONAL AssociA omi, supra, at 54647.
84. For cases suggesting that speech which is part of some larger criminal activity
whose object and effect is not solely the promulgation of ideas is not protected, see,
e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
581 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("teaching the techniques of sabotage, the assassination
of the President, the filching of documents from public files, the planting of bombs,
the art of street warfare, and the like ... should be beyond the pale . . . :); United
States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 171-73 (Ist Cir. 1969).
85. E.g., United States v. Reidel, 403 U.S. 924 (1971).
86. See note 78 supra.
87. E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
88. 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
89. The substantive standards for obscenity are described in EMERSo., TutE SvsrEM,
supra note 40, at 468-95, and their relationship to the prison environment is examined
in Jacob, supra note 5, at 240.
The federal district court in Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.RJ. 1970)
enjoined prison censors from, inter aia, screening pornography except under the Roth
standards. Id. at 788; cf. In re Harrell, 2 Cal.3d 675, 470 P.2d 640, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504
(1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971).
90. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam):
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State
to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.
See also Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966); Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Re-
examined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STN. L. REv. 1163, 1185 (1970);
Strong, Fifty Years of 'Clear and Present Danger': From Schenck to Brandenburg-and
Beyond, 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 41. In determining that a particular writing would incite a
prisoner to obstruct prison operations, prison authorities may take into account their
knowledge of inmate attitudes, but must establish that their judgment is based on
more than "mere apprehension," cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist..
393 U.S. 503 (1969), and "ex cathedra pronouncements," cf. Butts v. Dallas Independent
School Bd., 436 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971). Although this test may, on many occasions, be
difficult to apply, see EMERSON, THE Sysras, supra note 40. at 76, it should surely prevent
censorship of such writings as the rules of conduct of the Black Panther Party, the oath of
allegiance of the Republic of New Africa, and quotations from Mao Tze Tung--all of
which have been labeled "inflammatory racist literature" by some prison authorities.
See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 187 (2d Cir. 1971 (en bane). In fact, the degree to
which prison officials are inclined to attribute an "inflammatory" effect to generally
militant literature is indicated in a recent New York Times article which reported:
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In all cases, prison authorities should adhere to the procedural safe-
guards-including the assurance of a prompt, adversary judicial pro.
ceeding instituted by the censor-outlined in Freedman v. Maryland. 1
Prison officials are particularly irate about a recent state law that allows inmates
to receive any publications accepted by the Post Office. Some of the more popular
publications ... contain the violent rhetoric of the Black Panthers and other groups.
"We're under pressure by the civil liberties people to let anything in," said Mr.
Park [Associate Warden, San Quentin Correctional Institution). "All of this dis.
regards the fact that we're dealing with very unstable, very hostile people. We have
people who read it and take it literally, and go out and want to kill people."
N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1971, at 53, col. 2.
Although the incitement standard would permit limited censorship of incoming ma-
terial, it has no application to outgoing letters or manuscripts. Prison administrators
are in no position to judge whether or not a prisoner's writings might incite to crime
if read at some future time in some unknown place, and the needs of prison discipline
and security cannot be stretched to reach this form of communication. See Nolan v.
Fitzpatrick, 40 US.L.W. 2291, 2292 (1st Cir. Nov. 4, 1971); McCray v. State, 40 U.S.L.W.
2307, 2309 (Md. Cir. Ct. Nov. 11, 1971). But see lBerrigan v. Norton No. 71-1383, at 706 n.5
(2d. Cir. Nov. 26, 1971).
Several federal courts, especially in cases involving religious literature, have taken
firm if short steps toward the adoption of an incitement standard. As one court of
appeals emphasized:
Mere antipathy caused by statements derogatory of, and offensive to the white race
is not sufficient to justify the suppression of religious literature even in a prison.
Nor does the mere speculation that such statements may ignite racial or religious
riots in a penal institution warrant their proscription.
Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816, 822 (3rd Cir. 1968). See also Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis,
319 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Banks v. Havenor, 234 F. Supp. 27, 30 (E.D. Va. 1964).
91. 380 U.S. 51 (1965). Although the Freedman requirements are technically part of
the doctrine of prior restraints, discussed more fully at pp. 105.07 infra, they 'are
pertinent to determining how a system of censorship-found to be permissible under
the relatively weak less drastic means test-should be administered. In Freedman the
Court invalidated a motion picture censorship statute for its failure to provide adequate
procedural safeguards in the determination of obscenity. In Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S.
411 (1970), a unanimous Court held the same procedural requirements applicable to
mail censorship by the Post Office Department. The Blount Court, reiterating Freedman,
specified:
[T]o avoid constitutional infirmity a scheme of administrative censorship must:
place the burdens of initiating judicial review and of proving that the material is un.
protected expression on the censor; require "prompt judicial review"-a final judicial
determination on the merits within a specified, brief period-to prevent the ad.
ministrative decision of the censor from achieving an effect of finality; and linilt
to preservation of the status quo for the shortest, fixed period compatible with
sound judicial resolution, any restraint imposed in advance of the final judicial
determination.
Id. at 417. The basic premise of the code of procedure promulgated in Freedman-that
"[t]he separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for . .. sensitive tools . .. ,
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958)-is pertinent not merely to obscenity censor-
ship systems, but to all administrative bans of expression. See, e.g., LeFlore v. Robinson,
434 F.2d 933, 946-48 (5th Cir. 1970) (public assembly); cf. Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316
F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963) (administrative determination by
labor union of defamation of union official by union member voided). But cf. Eisner
v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1971). See generally Monaghan,
First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1970).
To comply with the Freedman standards prison censors who detect what they suspect
to be obscenity, incitement, or evidence of criminal conspiracy should seek a judicial
determination of the First Amendment status of the mail within "a specified brief perlod,"
and the reviewing court should then act promptly. The period of administrative delibera.
tion should not exceed, at the very most, two weeks, and the final determination by the
trial court, Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 n.22 (1968), should
be made in no more than sixty additional days. See United States v. Thirty.seven Photo.
graphs, 403 U.S. 924 (1971) (imposing these time limits on customs seizures of alleged
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As they now stand, however, prison mail regulations typically allow
administrators to censor writings which are well within the bounds
of protected speech. Under the ill-defined rubric of "rehabilitation,"
administrators may delete material at will,2 2 and, under the subject-
matter rules which tend to limit inmates' correspondence to social mat-
ters, officials prohibit prisoners from discussing numerous subjects1o
If prison authorities were truly capable of determining that a spe-
cific item in an inmate's mail were detrimental to his rehabilitation,
then perhaps the less drastic means test would permit the item to be
excised. At present, though, knowledge of inmate psychology and the
impact of mail regulation on the correctional process does not permit
such judgments. 4 Indeed, it is possible that mail censorship impedes
rehabilitationa and heightens inmate unrest.2 0 At best, this manner
obscenity); cf. N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1971, at 18, cols. 3-5 (city ed.) (allegation by inmates
of Rahway State Prison of purposeful three to four week delays in mail delivery). Fur-
thermore, as the Freedman Court emphasized, the judicial proceedings must be adversary.
Cf. Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
92. See p. 89 supra.
93. Id. Cf. Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1948).
94. See Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971); notes 139-43 infra.
It might be suggested that some information would obviously impede iniate reha-
bilitation. For example, it might not seem prudent to allow an inmate convicted
of bombing public buildings to study materials on the technology and construction of
explosive devices, yet rehabilitation must relate to fundamental attitudes, not merely
skills. If a correctional program is effective, the inmate will seek noncriminal endeavors;
if it is not, withholding technical information during his incarceration will not inhibit
his acquiring further criminal skills upon his release. Arguably, a more difficult question
is posed by literature extolling the virtues of particular crimes. Perhaps an incarcerated
sexual deviant should not be permitted to read material favorably describing se crimes.
Arguments such as these, however, rest upon the implicit factual assumption that there
is a correlation between the type of reading matter an inmate is exposed to and his
later conduct-an assumption which has no empirical basis. Cf. Stanley v. Georgia. 394
U.S. 557, at 566-67 (1969).
95. See, e.g., H. BARNEs & N. T.rrERs, NEw HoRizoNs i.- CR.lussoLocv 492 (3rd ed.
1959), quoted in Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 199 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc) and in
Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 786 (D.R.I. 1970):
Letter writing keeps the inmate in contact with the outside world, helps to hold in
check some of the morbidity and hopelessness produced by prison life and isolation,
stimulates his natural and human impulses, and otherwise may make contributions
to better mental attitudes and reformation.
As the Second Circuit pointed out, when inmates "become wary of placing intimate
thoughts or criticisms of the prison in letters," their sense of isolation is intensified,
and they feel an "artificial increase of alienation from society." Sostre v. McGinnis, 442
F.2d 178, 199 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), quoting Singer, supra note 5. See also Barrett v.
Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Hirschkop & Millemann, supra note 5, at 825.
96. One of the demands of inmates who were involved in the tragedy at the Attica
Correctional Facility this year was to "end all censorship of newspapers, magazines,
letters and other publications coming from the publisher." N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1971, at
44, cols. 4-5; likewise, grievances as to the handling of mail at Rahway State Prison
were a factor in the rioting at that institution. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1971, at 18,
col. 3 (city ed.). See also G. SY.Es, THE SoctEr" oF CAtrvrts 8 (1958) (viewing prison
riots as "highly dramatic efforts to communicate with the outside world, efforts in which
confined criminals pass over the heads of their captors to appeal to a new audience");
Landman v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 135, 141 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 920 (1967).
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of "psychiatric censorship" should be viewed as a theoretical possibility
rather than an acceptable justification for present censorship.
Likewise, forbidding inmates from so much as mentioning entire
subjects cannot be upheld under the less drastic means test. Subject-
matter restrictions constitute a severe infringement on a prisoner's
right to express himself; moreover, to compel inmates to "limit their
letters to matters of personal interest to friends and relatives" and to
forbid any mention of "other inmates or institutional personnel," 97 is
to deprive the public of what has come to be called its "right to
hear."98 Investing authorities with the power to censor statements in
a prisoner's letter, especially one to the press, on the ground that they
may be libelous,9 9 untrue, 00 "irrelevant,"' 01 or "repetitious"102  per-
mits criticism of prison practices to be withheld from the public by
the very persons who are criticized.108 Having no connection with the
interests in physical restraint and prisoner rehabilitation, censorship
of anything other than plans of criminal activity, obscenity, or incite-
ment 04 in correspondence with the press, business associates, 10 5 family
and friends should not be tolerated.100
97. TExAs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECIIONS, supra note 8. The rule also forbids "institu.
tional gossip or rumors."
98. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. 301 (1965); Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 40 U.SL.W. 2291 (1st Cir. Nov. 4, 1971); McCray
v. State, 40 U.S.L.W. 2307, 2309 (Md. Cir. Ct. Nov. 11, 1971); cf. Note, The Right of the
Press to Gather Information, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 838 (1971). New York has recently liber-
alized its rules governing access by the news media to penal institutions and inmates.
See N.Y. Times, July 21, 1971, at 39, cols. 2-4.
99. Cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931); Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified sub noi.
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en bane).
100. See Candelaria v. Mancusi, Civil No. 1970-491 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1971); Carothers
v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); McCray v. State, 40 U.S.L.W. 2307,
2309 (Md. Cir.-Ct. Nov. 11, 1971).
101. See Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); cf. Sostre v. Rocke.
feller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified sub nom., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d
178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc).
102. See Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370, 376-77 (D.D.C. 1962).
103. See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 201 (2d Cir. 1971) (en bane); Palmiglano v.
Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 788 (D.R.I. 1970); Brabson v. Wilkins, 19 N.Y.2d 433, 438.39,
227 N.E.2d 383, 385, 280 N.Y.S.2d 561, 565 (1967) (Keating, J., dissenting); ef. Ne w York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); EMERSON, THE SYsrEM, supra note 40, at 7.
104. The incitement ground for censorship applies only to incoming mail. See note
90 supra.
105. But see note 78 supra.
106. Since the less drastic means test curtails imposition of penalties or denial of
privileges in response to protected First Amendment conduct, see note 64 supra, sanc.
tioning inmates for correspondence which is protected under the standards outlined
above is equally impermissible. Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
In addition, special procedural safeguards may be imperative when what is arguably
First Amendment conduct is punished. See note 91 supra. For a general discussion of due
process requirements essential to prison disciplinary proceedings, see, e.g., Clutchette
v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 787 (D. Cal. 1971); Comment, Federal Court Intervention in
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B. Prior Restraints
The ultimate outcome of the application of the less drastic means
test is, as just elaborated, a system of censorship that gives officials
as much power as may be deemed consistent with the state interests
in restraint and rehabilitation. However, it should also be recognized
that prison mail regulations operate as prior restraints, 10 7 and, there-
fore, bear "a heavy presumption against [their] constitutional -a-
lidity."105 In this section, then, the narrowed system of mail censorship
found to survive application of the less drastic means test will be in-
spected in the light of the more demanding prior restraint doctrine,
and a set of constitutionally satisfactory regulations will be delineated.
Speaking very generally, the modern doctrine of prior restraints-
first enunciated in Near v. Minnesota1 09 -means that government
restrictions cannot be imposed upon speech or other kinds of expres-
sion in advance of publication.110 The Near Court itself, however,
indicated that this doctrine is not absolute,"1 and in rare instances
the Court has sustained prior restraints.112 After the highly fractured
opinion in New York Times Co. v. United States,113 the most accurate
State Prison Internal Disciplinary Hearings to Guarantee Fourteenth Amendment Pro-
cedural Due Process, 17 WAYNE L. REv. 931 (1971); cf. Buss, Procedural Due Process for
School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 545 (1971).
107. The first case explicitly recognizing that prison mail regulations are prior re-
straints is Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 40 U.S.L.W. 2291 (1st Cir. Nov. 4. 1971); hoivever, al-
though Judge Coffin wrote that "[t]he First Amendment prohibition against prior
restraints applies with even more than its usual force here," id. at 2107, the prison's
rule forbidding prisoners to write to the press was. struck down on the basis of less
drastic means principles.
The paradigm case of a prior restraint is the English s)stea of censorship practiced
between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. Under that system all printing presses
and printers were licensed and nothing could be published except with prior approval
of the state or church authorities. EMERSON, THE SYsmMs, supra note 40, at 504. The
analogy between the English licenser and the prison censor is a close one, but it might
be contended that a hypothetical system in which prison authorities were empowcred
to read, but not to delete, items in inmates' correspondence should not be classified as
a prior restraint. Whether or not a system of pure inspection is properly subject to prior
restraint analysis, the adverse effects of reading per se on free expression have already
been noted, see notes 66, 83 supra, and inspection, even without censorship, is defective
under less drastic means principles. See note 83 supra.
108. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713. 714 (1971) (per curiam),
quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
109. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
110. The doctrine does not touch on the question of what, if any subsequent punish.
ment can be administered for engaging in expression. See Ei.mtsox, Tiff Svs-ras, supra
note 40, at 504.
111. The Near Court's exceptions to the general rule against prior restraints were:
(1) in wartime certain dangerous speech might be curtailed; (2) obscene publications
might be subject to previous restraint; and (3) the security of community life might
be protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly
government. 283 U.S. at 716. For a discussion of the problems raised by these exceptions,
see Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAV & CoN-rM.1. PRnoD. 6-18 (1955).
112. See pp. 106-07 infra.
113. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
105
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statement of the principle would seem to be that prior restraints on
expression are presumptively unconstitutional."1 4 As such, prison mail
regulations should be unconstitutional unless they fall within an es-
tablished exception to the doctrine or unless there is a compelling
reason to fashion a new exception for the type of censorship practiced
in prisons.1"
1. Established Exceptions
First, although dicta in Near appear to exempt obscenity from
the rule on prior restraints,110 subsequent cases reveal that no flat
exception has been created.117 At no time has the Supreme Court ever
upheld prior submission of written material to a censoring body.118
114. The Court held that the New York Times and the Washington Post should not
be enjoined from publishing the contents of a classified study popularly known as The
Pentagon Papers. Except for the three paragraph per curiam opinion of the Court,
none of the ten opinions written by the Justices attracted more than three adherents.
The reasoning in the per curiam opinion started from the general premise that "(alny
system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presunption
against its constitutional validity," so that in the specific case, "[t]he Government 'thus
carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.'"
The opinion then noted that the lower courts "held that the Government had not met
that burden" and terminated its inquiry tersely, commenting "[w]e agree." See 403 U.S.
at 714.
115. The underlying basis of the prior restraint doctrine is entirely applicable to
censorship in the prison community. In the prison, as in the general society:
A system of prior restraint is in many ways more inhibiting than a system of
subsequent punishment: It is likely to bring tinder government scrutiny a far wider
range of expression; it shuts off communication before it takes place; suppression
by a stroke of the pen is more likely to be applied than suppression through a
criminal process; the procedures do not require attention to the safeguards of the
criminal process; the system allows less opportunity for public appraisal and criticism;
the dynamics of the system drive toward excesses, as the history of all censorship
shows.
EMERSON, THE SYSrES, supra note 40, at 506.
116. See note 111 supra.
117. See generally EMERSON, THE SYsrEM, supra note 40, at 506-12.
118. In Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961), a sharply divided
Court did uphold a system of censorship which entailed prior submission of films, btt
explicitly confined its holding to motion pictures. Id. at 50. See Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 n.10 (1963); cf. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 US. 51 (1965).
Similarly, in Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1959), the only Supreme Cotu
case which has upheld a prior restraint on written material, the Court was careftul not
to exempt from the rule against prior restraints any system which involves the requie.
ment of prior submission of written material to a censoring body. 354 U.S. at 441, 442.
See also Freedman v. Maryland, supra, at 60; EMERSON, THE SYSTEM, supra note 40, at 508.
Finally, in United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 403 U.S. 924 (1971), the Court,
in dictum, upheld the validity of inspection at customs of books purchased abroad; but
even if customs searches are conceived of as a prior submission process, that result was
rationalized by treating customs searches as sui generis.
For cases striking down various forms of prior restraints on written materials, see New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam); Organization for a
Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205
(1964); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, supra; Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717
(1961); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). But cf. United States v. Flower, 40 U,S.L.W.
2287 (5th Cir. Nov. 8, 1971) (requirement that peace group obtain prior authorization
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Therefore, the possibility that inmate mail-incoming or outgoing-
might contain obscenity does not place prison mail inspection, even
if it were limited to uncovering obscenity, in any established excep-
tion to the prior restraint doctrine.
Second, prior restraints designed to encourage expression by avoid-
ing conflicts among persons competing for the use of the same physical-
ly limited communications facilities have been allowed. The Supreme
Court has upheld government licensing of radio and television 10 and
municipal permit systems for public assemblies, 12 0 but neither of these
prior restraints is apposite to prison mail censorship.12'
Finally, although the dicta in Near v. Minnesota seem to remove
incitement to acts of violence and disorder from the scope of the prior
restraint principle, 22 the continuing validity of this exception is, to
say the least, an ambiguous proposition. The Supreme Court has
vacillated and lower courts are divided, 2 3 but commentators tend to
agree that suppression imposed to prevent the threat of disorder from
materializing should not constitute an exception to the prior restraint
doctrine. 12 4 The incitement standard is difficult enough to apply after
the fact, 123 but to use it in an effort to predict whether a prisoner,
upon receipt of a publication in his mail, will rebel against prison
discipline would make for a hopelessly speculative rule of law.12
to distribute leaflets on army base held not to violate prior restraint doctrine); Eisner
v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971) (requirement of prior approval
for distribution of newspapers on high school grounds held not to violate prior restraint
doctrine if proper procedural safeguards incorporated).
119. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386.90 (1969); National Broad-
casting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943).
120. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.
569 (1941). Most permit systems have, however, been stricken for vagueness. See EMESO.n,
THE SysrEMf, supra note 40, at 372 n.117.
121. The licensing power of the Federal Communications Commission, designed to
protect "the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, aesthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences," Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 395 US.
367, 390 (1969), lends no support to the censorship power of prison authorities, which
operates to restrict rather than augment communications to and from the public. Nor
does the use of the mails pose the problem of limited ph)sical facilities for communi-
cation. Cf. E ERsoN, THE SvsrE'.i, supra note 40, at 661.
Likewise, the fact that an exception to the general rule against prior restraints may
exist to permit municipalities to institute reasonable controls over the time, place and
manner of public assemblies has no bearing on the constitutionality of reading and
censoring prisoner mail, though it does support the proposition that prison officials
can impose reasonable regulations on the time, place and manner of matl delivery and
pickup. Cf. note 62 supra.
122. See note 111 supra.
123. See generally EmrEiso.z, THE Sysrmm, supra note 40, at 343.
124. See Emransox, THE Sysmm, supra note 40, at 344; Blasi, Prior Restraints on
Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1482 (1970); Note, Equity on the Campus, 80 YALE
LJ. 987, 1000 (1971).
125. Cf. Em..soN, THE Sysrnr., supra note 40, at 328-36.
126. See Equity on the Campus, supra note 124, at 1004-05; Note, Conspiracy and the
First Amendment, 79 YALE L.J. 872, 880-81 (1970).
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2. Establishing New Exceptions
Although prison mail regulations fall within none of the established
exceptions to the general principle that prior restraints on expression
are forbidden by the First Amendment, it might well be argued that
the prison is a unique institution, with unusual needs and problems,
requiring the creation of special exceptions. Three factors seem to
differentiate the use of the mails where prisoners are involved from
the manner in which they are normally utilized.
First, drugs, explosives and devices such as weapons and implements
of escape that are especially dangerous in the prison context, are more
likely to be present in mail sent to inmates. The First Amendment
prior restraint doctrine, however, in no way bars the interception of
physical contraband. Guns, narcotics, metal files, and the like are not
protected speech,1 27 and the problem of opening mail to locate these
items is a Fourth Amendment one. 128 Courts almost always uphold
warrantless searches of inmate mail as reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment,'120 and, as long as adequate safeguards are introduced
to ensure that no mail is read' 0° in the course of the search, 181 removal
127. See notes 82, 83 supra.
128. Searches and seizures of publications must adhere to special procedural safeguards,
For an analysis of this interplay between the First and Fourth Amendments, see Note,
Prior Adversary Hearings on the Question of Obscenity, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1413-21
(1970).
129. See cases cited, supra note 6. An analysis of the Fourth Amendment Issue Is
beyond the scope of this Note, but it should be observed that where prisoners have signed
a consent form permitting inspection of their mail, see pp. 87-88 supra, this should not
constitute a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights in view of the coercive conditions under
which such consent is obtained. Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 792 (D.R.I.
1970). Furthermore, Post Office regulations governing warrantless searches of mail have
little bearing on prison mail inspection practices.
Under current Post Office regulations first.class mail may not be opened without a
search warrant. 39 U.S.C. §§ 4057-58 (1964). That postal inspectors are authorized to
open second, third and fourth class mail without a warrant for purposes pertaining to
the operation of the postal system cannot be construed as authorizing warrantless inspec.
tions by other persons, such as prison censors, for oth6r reasons. For materials on the
validity of the Post Office regulations, see I T. EMERsoN, D. HADER & N. DoasEN, POLITI.
CAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 693-96 (3rd ed. 1967).
130. The invalidity of reading, even without subsequent censorship, is indicated at
notes 66, 83, and 107 supra. In some instances, opening correspondence will inevitably
entail some reading. For example, if an inmate is sent a copy of a magazine, it will be
all but impossible for an inspector to avoid noticing the title as he leafs through for
contraband. To avoid the chilling effect this might have on communication with inmates,
physical tests for contraband that do not necessitate actual opening of mail should be
used, see note 131 infra, or, as a minimum precaution, prison authorities should be
barred from recording the titles of publications sent to an inmate.
131. One study of contraband searches revealed that letters opened during the course
of routine searches of incoming mail were read thoroughly. See B. Brown, Rules of
Communication by Pretrial Detainees at the Connecticut Correctional Institute at Niantle
(1971) (unpublished paper on file at the Yale Law journal). One way to overcome this
problem would be to require that the inmate addressee or some neutral party be present
when prison officials open and inspect packages for contraband; or, physical tests for the
presence of contraband that do not entail opening and inspecting packages might be
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of physical contraband does not conflict with the prior restraint
doctrine.13 2
Second, mail to and from prisoners differs from mail in general in
that escape plans may be present in prison mail. The statistical fre-
quency with which this would occur if the policy of universal inspec-
tion of correspondence with family, friends, business associates, and
the media were abandoned is impossible to predict,133 but the fact
that escape plans are now uncovered in mail which inmates know to
be inspected13 4 suggests that the problem is a real one.
Nevertheless, it is easy to place too much emphasis on mail inspec-
tion as a means of thwarting escapes. Eliminating routine administra-
tive inspection of letters would hardly leave the state powerless:
escape from a penitentiary is itself a criminal offense in most juris-
dictions, 35 and persons outside the prison who would use the mails
to aid inmates in planning, attempting, or executing escapes would
be subject to prosecution as conspirators.1 30 For years penologists have
employed. Cf. Marsh v. Moore, 325 F. Supp. 392 (D. Mass. 1971) (enjoining prison officials
from "intercepting, delaying, reading, opening letters or other correspondence" betwcen
an inmate and his attorney, but permitting prison authorities "to examine correspond-
ence with a fluoroscope or a metal-detecting device"), Peoples v. Wainwright, 325 F.
Supp. 402 (M.D. Fla. 1971) (permitting inmate/attorney mail to be submitted "to what-
ever tests may be appropriate for security purposes without opening the envelopes').
132. If the search is to extend beyond locating and removing physical contraband, a
warrant describing what is to be read should be obtained beforehand.
It should be clear that although routine, limited physical inspection of incoming
mail is consistent with prior restraint principles, the physical contraband rationale is
irrelevant to outgoing mail.
133. One court of appeals has expressed a certain amount of skepticism for what it
called "the dubious assumption" that newsmen would participate in escape attempts.
Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 40 U.S.L.W. 2291, 2292 (Ist Cir. Nov. 4, 1971). In making any
estimate of the impact of eliminating routine inspection of prisoner letters on the
incidence of escapes, two factors should be kept in mind: the difficulty of actually es.
caping from the prison, and the difficulty of effecting a successful escape once outside
the walls. The system proposed above would prevent inmates from using the mails to
obtain weapons, files, ropes or other implements which might be needed to escape from
secure institutions. But only a dozen (approximately three per cent) of the 347 ecapes
from federal institutions during the fiscal year 1970 were from maximum security insti-
tutions. Key Interview, supra note 55. As for prisoners confined in minimum security
institutions near population centers, prisoner correspondence is unlikely to have a sub-
stantial impact on escapes, since it is relatively simple for an escapee to reach quickly
a place where recapture will be difficult. Thus the category of inmates whose likelihood
of escape is most affected by free correspondence ith possible confederates is those
inmates confined in minimum security institutions far from population centers-for
these potential escapees, a rendezvous with confederates once outside the walls is impor-
tant. Regrettably, there is no good information breaking down minimum security
institutions by proximity to population centers. It should be noted, however, that while
some correctional systems, like the federal one, utilize a multi-tiered grouping of prisons
and attempt to use "security risk" criteria in assigning prisoners to facilities, others,
like New York, have almost nothing but maximum security prisons. See N.Y. Times,
Oct. 24, 1971 § 4, at 9, col. I.
134. Key Interview, supra note 55.
135. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 751 (1963); United States v. Wilke, No. 71-1724 (9th Cir.
Nov. 15, 1971) (per curiam).
136. See, e.g., A.L.I., MODEL PENAL CODE § 503(l)(Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
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urged the adoption of reforms that have entailed some risk of addi-
tional escapes.'3 7 Thus, the fear that more escape plans might find
their way through prison mails should not remove regulation of in-
mate mail from the reach of the prior restraint doctrine. Where prison
officials do not secure a search warrant to inspect letters for evidence
of criminality, reading or censoring such letters should be barred,
Finally, prison mail is distinguishable from other correspondence
in that communications with prisoners may have adverse effects on
the ultimate rehabilitation of inmates. As many commentators have
noted, perhaps the most telling indication of the failure of our penal
system is the high rate of recidivism associated with it.138 If definitive
evidence were to show that prohibition, inspection or censorship of
inmate mail were essential components of an effective rehabilitative
process, it is conceivable that their presumptive unconstitutionality
as prior restraints would be overcome. At present, however, no "hard"
data is available,13 9 and it is doubtful that prison personnel can identi-
fy what information would or would not retard rehabilitation.140 If
anything, the conclusion reached by the California Supreme Court 41
as well as by numerous commentators, 4 2 that "a strictly controlled
intellectual diet" 143 may itself discourage prisoner rehabilitation, may
137. Thus, low security institutions have become more prevalent despite the higher
incidence of escapes from such facilities. See note 133 supra. Prison experts are virtually
unanimous in recommending that prison facilities be constructed in or near large cities
even though the risk of escape might be heightened somewhat as a result. See N.Y. Times,
Oct. 25, 1971, at 29, col. 1. Reforms directed toward increasing inmate participation In
outside activities, such as work-release programs, are also generally regarded as de.
sirable by experts, although they, too, might add to the escape rate. See, e.g., BurvuAu
OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF justcE, NEw ROLES FOR JAILS: GUIDELINES FOR PLANNING 5.6
(1969); N.Y. Times, supra.
138. See R. HOOD & R. SPARKS, KEY ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 171-92 (1970). But see
D. GLAsER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SSTENI 15 (abridged ed. 1969):
Imprisonment and parole, as procedures for dealing with felons, are far from com-
plete failures, although they are far from "sure cures." Apparently, no more than a
third of the men released from prison are convicted of further felonies, even where
half or more have some further difficulty with the law.
139. See HooD & SPARKS, supra note 138, at 193-234; GLASER, supra note 138.
140. See HOOD & SPARKS, supra note 138, at 215-34; GLASER, supra note 138, at 4.
141. See In re Harrell, 2 Cal.3d 675, 703-04, 470 P.2d 640, 645, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504, 509(1970). cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971).
142. See notes 95-96 supra. See also Turner, supra note 5, at 487 n.97:
Indeed, unrestricted communication with the outside world and maintaining close
family contact through free correspondence would seem to have obvious rehablil.
tative value.
Cf. authorities cited in Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 n.14 (2d Cir. 1971) (en bane),
143. In striking down as inconsistent with a state statute prison regulations banning
materials deemed by officials to be not "conducive to rehabilitation" because they
tended to incite crime, the court observed:
It may well be that even persons who have committed antisocial acts warranting their
imprisonment may derive greater rehabilitative benefits from a relatively free access
to the thoughts of all mankind as reflected in the published word than they would
derive from a strictly controlled intellectual diet.
In re Harrell, 2 Cal.3d 675, 703-04, 470 P.2d 640, 645, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504, 509 (1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971).
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be the correct one. Certainly, current understanding of the correctional
process does not warrant fashioning an exception based on "rehabili-
tation" to the general rule that prior restraints are unconstitutional.
The First Amendment doctrines of less drastic means and prior
restraints establish the constitutional necessity of a more refined sys-
tem of prison mail regulation than the structure of restrictions, pro-
hibitions, inspections, and deletions now prevalent at most prisons.
No limitations should be imposed on the basis of the identity of the
recipients or the frequency of the correspondence. Unless authorities
first establish that they have probable cause to believe that a search
will lead to the discovery of physical contraband or criminal activity,
correspondence with courts, attorneys and public officials should not
be opened, inspected or censored. To enable officials to intercept
physical contraband, incoming mail from friends, family, business
associates and the media may constitutionally be opened without a
warrant. But strict safeguards should be implemented to prevent ad-
ministrative reading of such incoming mail, and all such outgoing
correspondence should be free from routine inspection and censorship.
